CY-GAP-SCSE-B0C70C26-01OPENMEDIUM-HIGH
SHARED_UPSTREAM_ACCESS_LINEAGE
جارٍ تحميل البيانات التشغيلية
SCSE
Software supply chain, package ecosystems, CI/CD/release pipelines, signing/provenance, maintainer compromise, build artifacts and downstream exposure
3
36
190
86
11
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Cross-domain run records strict dedupe boundary: LiteLLM, Cursor and Gheist remain distinct supply-chain identities; adjacency to AI credential economy is contextual unless shared upstream lineage emerges.
مرجع SSOT مسجل، لكن الرابط الداخلي مخفي حتى تفعيل حماية Admin.
الإجمالي: 14 Evidence
No reliable public count of hosts/environments that installed and executed LiteLLM 1.107.0 or affected container tags during the compromise window.
Version-specific registry telemetry plus execution/IR/provider/customer reporting.
No verified public denominator/count for internal mirrors, derived images, build outputs or downstream packages incorporating affected artifacts.
Registry/cache/SBOM/build provenance, downstream hashes and incident reports.
Credential-stealing capability and release-workflow credential abuse are established, but downstream stolen-secret reuse and October actor identity are not quantified/attributed.
Cloud/source-control audit logs, victim IR, actor-linked infrastructure and authoritative attribution.
No reliable denominator exists for custom GitLab deployments upgraded at the app layer but still using vulnerable Ruby/Onigmo.
Version-aware GitLab+Ruby telemetry or large-sample authenticated inventory.
Exact credential/account/workflow path allowing malicious builds into Cursor Marketplace is not publicly established.
Cursor RCA, marketplace audit/publisher logs and compromised-identity timeline.
No reliable public denominator separates install/update exposure, loader execution, persistence installation and successful remote SSH access.
Marketplace install telemetry plus endpoint execution/persistence/network/authentication evidence.
No authoritative public denominator for stolen tokens, affected organizations, reachable repositories, successful workflow executions or unique victims.
GitHub/provider telemetry plus organization-level incident data mapping accounts/tokens/repos/runs.
No public count of secrets successfully exfiltrated or downstream cloud actions attributable to Gheist across affected organizations.
Victim GitHub audit logs, workflow logs, cloud OIDC/role assumptions, secret-use telemetry and IR findings.
Public evidence does not quantify interactive sessions, credential/session abuse, lateral movement or identify the actor.
Victim IR, authentication/network logs, cloud/source-control audit logs and authoritative attribution.
Per-account token origin and operator identity are unresolved; overlap with infostealers, Trivy exposure and other campaigns is insufficient for a single-source/single-actor claim.
Credential provenance, endpoint malware evidence, token audit history, shared infrastructure and authoritative attribution.
No reliable public denominator for self-hosted runner jobs that executed successfully or host/cloud/Kubernetes credentials actually collected.
Runner endpoint telemetry, successful job artifacts, cloud/Kubernetes audit evidence and victim/provider reports.