Electronic Wallet Balance Theft — Jordan & Palestine — Mobile Fraud Intelligence (MFI)
PASSNot recorded
Date
29 Oct 2026
Domain
Mobile Fraud Intelligence (MFI)
Topic
Electronic Wallet Balance Theft — Jordan & Palestine
Status
PASS
Verified Findings
None
Contradictions / Caveats
UNKNOWN: PMA reported roughly 2 million electronic-wallet owners by mid-2026, including a large unbanked segment; this establishes exposure/adoption scale, not fraud incidence.
Evidence boundary: Does not measure wallet-fraud victim count, fraud rate, actor identity, or specific attack mechanism.
UNKNOWN: PalPay wallet registration/operation relies materially on the Palestinian mobile number and OTP, making control of the phone/SIM/OTP path security-relevant.
Evidence boundary: Does not prove SIM swap, eSIM abuse, OTP theft, or account takeover occurred in any specific incident.
UNKNOWN: A June 2026 report attributed to PalPay warned users not to share OTP/QR/passwords and flagged sudden network loss or an unrequested eSIM as a security warning sign.
Evidence boundary: Does not prove a SIM/eSIM takeover incident, prevalence, or linkage to Jordanian fraud cells.
UNKNOWN: Specialist-media reporting documented Gaza victims targeted through impersonation/fake support or institutional contacts, verification-code capture and subsequent balance loss/transfer in a high-wallet-use environment.
Evidence boundary: Does not establish national prevalence, a single campaign, malware causation, or linkage to the 2024 Jordan wallet cell.